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Abstract—A government’s approach towards establish-
ing the online identity of its citizens is often subject
to heated debate. This debate is sometimes obscured by
the lack of clarity regarding the specific approach that
a government adopts towards identity management. We
propose a taxonomy for the type of identity management
that a government can pursue. Our taxonomy identifies
three essential approaches: a decentralized, a federal,
and a centralized type. We illustrate our taxonomy using
three countries that have approaches characteristic of each
type: Australia, the United States, and the Netherlands
respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many government agencies around the world have
begun to implement online versions of the services
that they provide to their citizens. Examples of these
services include the ability to file tax returns online,
and the ability to claim benefits online. For each of
these services, the government agency has a need to
establish the identity of the individual requesting the
service. How these identities are established, and the
extent to which government agencies work together to
do so, is the domain of online identity management.
Online identity management and identity management
in general is subject to heated debate. This is particularly
the case for those policy initiatives that attempt to
share citizen data amongst several, seemingly unrelated,
government services. Advocates of these initiatives claim
that it will increase efficiency, prevent fraud, and help
against terrorist activity. On the other hand, many have
warned against the dangers of arriving at a “database
state”, mentioning the erosion of civil liberties, the
invasion of privacy, and the rise of a totalitarian regime
or police state. Identity cards are often seen as the
ultimate catalyst for these undesirable outcomes. Their
(imminent) advent can prompt fierce political opposition
(e.g., in the United Kingdom, as documented in [1]).
With the amount of public attention that identity
management receives, it is easy to forget that information
systems (IS) research can provide a meaningful contri-
bution to the debate, and indeed, has been doing so for
many years. For example, IS researchers have studied
the concerns for privacy extensively, and have found that
people’s stated concerns for privacy rarely correspond
with their overt behavior online [2]. There are also more
technical expose’s of how common digital identities can
be established without having to resort to Big-Brother
style databases [3]. A final example of a valuable IS
contribution is the thoughtful work of Clarke [4] on
digital personas.
It is our intention in this paper to contribute to
this debate by formulating a taxonomy of government
approaches towards online identity management. Such
a taxonomy would allow us to classify government
initiatives based on the approach they encourage or
discourage towards online identity management. This
would be helpful for a number of reasons. First of all,
it would clarify the public debate. Second, it would be
possible to compare more meaningfully the activities of
one government with the activities of another. Third, it
would allow us to start theorizing about online identity
management. We could, for example, start to identify
which of these approaches are the more successful and
under what circumstances.
We are not aware of any previous attempt to char-
acterize the type of government approach towards iden-
tity management. There is, however, related work that
provides different ways in which one can identify types
of identity. Mont et al. [5] illustrate how one could
conceptualize different ways (“views”) of identity, in
that governments, companies, and other institutions have
different but overlapping representations of identity. Ot-
jacques et al. [6] have examined the identity management
approaches of 25 European countries, but have focused
on the format of the identifiers in each country.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
We introduce the three types of online identity manage-
ment approaches in the next section. We then identify
several key indicators of each management approach that
will allow us to ascertain whether a government adopts
one approach or the other. We apply those indicators
to three different countries to demonstrate how each
of these countries adopts a different type of identity
management. We hope that this illustrates the usefulness
of the framework because it shows how difficult it is
to compare the approaches in different countries where
they adopt different types. This, in turn, we hope will
help clarify and contribute to the debate.
II. CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT
For the purposes of our classification, four concepts
need to be introduced and more precisely defined. These
concepts are outlined below. The definition of these
concepts is in line with other work in this area [3], [5],
[7].
Government agency: A more or less autonomous
branch of government. Agencies of interest here provide
online services to citizens, e.g., online tax returns, online
benefit claims, online requests for student loans, and so
on.
Identity stores: An identity store refers to the database
where verified identities are captured for use in govern-
ment services.
It is important to distinguish between physical and
logical identity stores. Physical identity stores reside in a
particular data centre at a particular geographic location.
Logical identity stores may combine disparate physical
stores and provide the virtual perception of one identity
store. In this way, government can share identity stores
without these identity stores having to reside in one
single database at one single data centre.
Identity registration system: These systems are the
subcomponents of the e-government services where iden-
tities are managed and maintained. They are often ad-
ministered separately from the services, as they can be
re-used and shared by more than one different service.
In fact we shall see that the degree to which these
registration management systems are shared within and
between the government agencies is a key element of
our taxonomy.
Identity credentials: Credentials are the evidence that
an individual supplies to demonstrate rightful “owner-
ship” of the identity [7]. Examples of credentials include
pin codes, passports, proof of address, bank statement,
and so on.
Depending on the type of service, the government
may require a higher ’level’ of credential. Such levels of
assurance can be used to classify the types of credentials
that are required for each system. A Level 1 system
might not require any credential at all (e.g., a public
website with government announcements). A level 4
system (e.g., a law enforcement database) must require
substantial verification of credentials to establish the
correct identity.
Figure 1 brings these four concepts together in a
flowchart, describing the essential steps of the identity
management process.
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Fig. 1. The identity management process
The process can be decomposed into four steps. The
citizen first supplies his or her identity credentials to an
identity management system (step 1). Based on these
credentials, the identity management system then estab-
lishes (or rejects) the identity of this citizen, and stores
this information in the identity store (step 2). Following
this, the citizen can successfully use an online service
(e.g., request a student loan or query a law enforcement
database, step 3). The online service will check the
citizen’s credentials using the identity store that was
previously mentioned.
We are now in a position to outline three types of
approaches towards online identity management. We
have called them the decentralized approach, the federal
approach, and the centralized approach.
1) Decentralized approach: With this approach, each
government agency develops its own identity registration
systems and accompanying policies to suit its own needs.
It maintains and manages its own identity stores. The
identity credentials issued to a citizen will be unique to
the agency. The citizen will find these credentials of no
use for accessing other government services online.
One of the advantages of the decentralized approach
is that the impact of a security breach is potentially
much lower than in any of the other approaches. This
is because if one identity store is compromised, it will
have no effect on any of the other identity stores.
One of the disadvantages of the decentralized ap-
proach is its inefficiency. Many tasks around the han-
dling of identity are duplicated, and this can lead to
inconsistencies and errors. Second, because identities are
only known and verified at the local level, this approach
creates opportunities for criminal activity. Finally, with
this approach it has been argued that the government
does not have a complete picture of the citizen. Such
a complete picture would help a government to detect
criminal patterns or terrorist activity.
2) Federal approach: Under this approach, a group
of government agencies enter into a trust federation and
agree using shared policy and technology standards and
protocols to accept each others identity credentials to
allow citizens to access each others online services.
It is important to recognize that such a trust federation
could also be established between a government agency
and a non-governmental organization, such as a bank.
In the United States for example, such organizations are
called credential service providers or trusted third parties.
On the face of it, this approach would seem to have
the same advantages and disadvantages of the decentral-
ized approach. There is a reduced impact of a security
breach, but there is still duplication of work. The biggest
difference, of course, is for the citizen, who only needs to
supply identity credentials once to use every service in
the trust federation. In the decentralized approach, the
citizen has to supply identity credentials for each and
every government agency.
The point needs to be made here that although there is
great benefit for the citizen in this model, it is not imme-
diately obvious where the benefits are for the particular
government agency. If anything, this approach carries an
additional administrative and technical overhead with it,
i.e., using the extra arrangements to deal with the identity
stores of other agencies. From a technical point of view,
however, such overhead can be minimal, and commercial
off-the-shelf applications are available that can manage
this overhead seamlessly.
3) Centralized approach: Under this approach, a
central government agency manages and stores citizen
identities in a single location (at least logically), and all
government agencies are required to connect their online
services to the central identity provider (or identity
verification service). For the citizen, this approach carries
the same advantages as the federal approach. Citizens
only need to supply identity credentials once. They can
then use their identity in all government agencies that
have embraced the separate identity service.
For a government, the centralized approach also car-
ries clear advantages. There is no duplication of work,
at least in theory. There is a complete picture of the
citizen, which helps reduce criminal opportunities, and
aids in intelligence activities. The “big-picture” is also
much simpler to grasp, with an identity provider being
the centre in a hub-and-spoke-like arrangement. These
are all bona-fide arguments for a centralized approach.
The approach, however, carries its own set of disad-
vantages too. Because every citizen’s identity is stored
in one place (at least logically), the impact of a security
breach can be high. There are potentially great threats
to privacy in case such a security breach does happen.
Several high-profile cases in which much citizen data
was lost illustrate that the occurrence of a security breach
is not at all improbable.
Second, there is the possibility of misguided, in-
advertent, or unintentional use of a citizen’s data by
government agencies. There may be strict government
guidelines as to which agency can use which part of
the identity store for which reasons. Yet when those
guidelines are not strictly followed, very undesirable
outcomes may arise as a result.
Third, there are the technical challenges that need to
be overcome to build such huge identity stores. Many
governments do not have a spotless track record on the
delivery of information systems within time and budget.
Indeed, many citizens mistrust a government’s ability to
create, develop and maintain such a huge identity store
appropriately.
These are the three approaches to online identity
management. A visual summary of each approach is
provided in Figure 2.
III. CASE STUDIES
In this section we will look at three countries and
examine their identity management type using our pre-
viously discussed framework. We have chosen these
countries for illustrative purposes because they each
represent a different approach in our taxonomy. They
are Australia (decentralized approach), the United States
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(federal approach), and the Netherlands (centralized ap-
proach).
The data for these case studies was collected by
the first author in the context of the project GUIDE,
a European Union-funded project that investigated the
potential for cross-border identity management within
the E.U. In addition, secondary data was collected more
recently and specifically for this paper.
Australia
Identity Management for Australian government agen-
cies and departmental online services is the individual
responsibility of each government owner of an on-line
application. The general approach may be characterized
as ad-hoc. Citizens wishing to enroll to use an electronic
government service will in most cases have had to
present a number of paper-based documents to each
agency in order to provide the agency with verifiable
data. The Australian Federal Government (Department of
Defense) publishes an Information and Communications
Technology Security Manual to provide guidance to
agencies on a range of security issues including identi-
fication and authentication. Furthermore, the Australian
Government Information Management Office (AGIMO)
also publishes guidance to agencies on developing the
processes and technology required to provide the desired
levels of identity and risk management confidence (Na-
tional eAuthentication Framework or NeAF).
Each agency or government department is responsible
for establishing its own identity management system to
support its own online government applications. Aus-
tralian legislation governs aspects of this such as data
protection for personal data that may be stored, but there
is no mandated government-wide approach.
Agencies that adopt the guidance provided by AGIMO
will consider five levels of assurance (0 - 4) that are
defined in the NeAF. The levels (that are similar to those
in our other two cases below) are based on the likely
impacts of getting e-Authentication wrong by evaluating
the nature of threats, the associated risks (e.g. financial
loss) and their likely threat impact vis-a`-vis the proba-
bility of their occurrence. This probability is increased
or reduced by taking into account risk mitigation factors
other than e-Authentication.
The NeAF assurance levels are defined as:
Level 0 Null (insignificant threat impact)
Level 1 Minimal (minor threat impact)
Level 2 Moderate (major threat impact)
Level 3 High (catastrophic threat impact)
In order to use an online government service, citizens
register with each service independently and hence need
to remember multiple pins, passwords, secret questions
and the like. Some government departments have entered
into bi-lateral relationships to share identity data for the
purposes of cross-checking credentials to help counter
identity fraud. With a decentralized approach to identity
management it is difficult to ascertain the level of adop-
tion as this type of information is not publicly available.
The Australian approach to identification and au-
thentication is characteristic of our decentralized type.
There are multiple fragmented identity services, some
of which share information. In most cases, users of
online government services can opt to register and use
the service or they can transact with government using
traditional paper-based means.
United States
In 2001, U.S. President Bush’s management agenda
included mandates to increase the use of electronic
government. This was to be operationalized through the
Federal government’s 25 Quicksilver initiatives. These
e-Government projects included government to citizen,
government to business and government to government
online services as well as internal efficiency focused
projects. The linchpin initiative e-authentication was set
up as a cross-cutting measure to facilitate the online veri-
fication of users of government services - and essentially
to enable the remaining 24 quicksilver initiatives.
The US General Services Administration (GSA) set
up the E-Authentication Program Management Office
(PMO) in 2001. Following extensive research and con-
sultation, in 2003 they had decided to adopt a federated
identity approach and in 2004 created a technical archi-
tecture to support this. After several years of operation,
the E-Authentication Federation was moved (in 2007)
to a GSA line of business. It is now located in the
Office of Integrated Technology Services of the U.S.
Federal Acquisition Service. The management of the
identity federation is split into Oversight & Policy and
Operations.
The federation is predicated on a risk and assurance
framework which consists of assurance levels. These
were provided by the Executive Office of the President
and describe an agency’s degree of certainty that the user
has presented an identifier (or credential) that refers to
their identity [8]; they are:
Level 1 Little or no confidence in the asserted iden-
tity’s validity.
Level 2 Some confidence in the asserted identity’s
validity.
Level 3 High confidence in the asserted identity’s
validity.
Level 4 Very high confidence in the asserted iden-
tity’s validity.
Citizens, federal employees, or businesses who want
access to an online government service go to the online
application and are presented with a list of credential ser-
vices that are appropriate for the assurance level required
for the government service. The user then selects the
credential service that has issued them a credential (for
example their own bank). The credential service provider
(CSP) asks the user for their credential and verifies
it. The CSP authenticates the user to the government
service and the user is given access. For level 3 or 4
transactions, a digital certificate may be used as a more
secure credential (provided by the user to the government
service and verified by a validation authority).
By 2009, 27 government agencies were using the
federation services of E-Authentication to provide online
access to their applications. Credential Service Providers
include for example, a US bank (Wells Fargo), and many
US government departments such as the Department of
Justice and the Government Printing Office.
The US E-Authentication federation is a defining
example of our federal approach. The US government
has set out in detail the way in which the systems can
use authentication mechanisms though shared, federal
identity management systems [9]. It should be noted
that the federal approach is not an open identity market-
place, rather, it is based on a variety of policies and
agreements between all parties or members of the iden-
tity federation. In the US example, these agreements
include the E-Authentication Federation Governance (a
document intended to improve the internal management
of the Federal Government), the E-Authentication Fed-
eration Operational Standards (a document that defines
operational standards for Federation Members), and the
E-Authentication Federation Relying Party Agreement (a
signed agreement between the E-Authentication Program
Management Office and the Relying Party).
The Netherlands
In 2003, four large government agencies founded
DigiD, a shared online identity registration service for
the e-government services that they are providing. The
government agencies were the Social Insurance Institute
(SVB, Sociale Verzekeringsbank), the Centre for Work
and Income (CWI, Centrum voor Werk en Inkomen),
the Employees’ Insurance and Benefits Office (UWV,
Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen) and the
Tax Authorities (Belastingdienst).
In early 2006 the systems and its operations were
handed over to a common maintenance organization,
GBO.Overheid. The organization forms part of the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs. As of today there are over 400
Dutch local authorities (towns and villages) who use
DigiD as their central identity registration system.
The DigiD initiative carries three levels of assurance
(similar to the four levels of assurance in use in the
U.S. and Australia). Each level of assurance requires
a progressively stronger set of identity credentials [10].
They are listed below:
Basis (basic) Login name and password
Midden (medium) Login name, password, and verifi-
cation code supplied as text mes-
sage
Hoog (high) Identity card
Citizens can sign up for their identity at the website
www.digid.nl. The identity is linked with the citizen’s
Dutch identification number, the use of which is strictly
prohibited by law and only permitted for use in public
services. The online identity expires after 18 months of
inactivity. Every time a citizen uses their DigiD identity
it becomes valid for a further 18 months. The high
level of assurance is not operational at the time of
writing; identity cards have not yet been issued in the
Netherlands.
The DigiD registration system enjoys widespread ac-
ceptance due to active promotion and endorsement by the
Dutch tax authorities. One million users were registered
in April 2006 [11].
The Dutch situation exhibits all the hallmarks of a
centralized identity management approach. There is only
one identity service, which is used by many different
government agencies. It is of interest to note that the
use of DigiD by government agencies is voluntary. Any
government agency or local authority can join if it is
permitted by law to use the Dutch identification number
and provides some form of public e-service [11].
IV. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have set out to ascertain types of
government approaches towards online identity manage-
ment. We have identified three types: the decentralized
model, the federal model, and the centralized model.
We have discussed several aspects of each model, and
applied the taxonomy to three cases to illustrate its
usefulness.
In this section we propose several extensions and
development areas for the model. We look at the po-
tential for harmonization of online identity management,
whether we can frame the model as a maturity model,
and the possibilities for further theorizing on identity
management.
Harmonization of online identity management
An important question that can be asked in the context
of identity management is whether identity management
approaches can be harmonized across different countries.
The natural domain where such a question arises is
within the European Union (EU), where identity har-
monization is of interest because it supports movement
of people within the EU [12].
If EU harmonization of identity management ap-
proaches is ever to happen, it will certainly have to
come a long way from where it is at the time of writing.
The picture today is that of many different approaches,
even within certain countries. The survey of Otjacques
et al. [6] is particularly illustrative of this. The number
of personal attributes (e.g., gender, age, and so on) that
is connected with a country’s main national identity
number ranges from four (Lithuania) to 24 (Bulgaria
and Cyprus). In some countries, the centralized form
of online identity management is in fact illegal (e.g.
Germany).
We could tentatively suggest that the way forward
for cross-border online identity management would be
to adopt the federal approach, with several types of
trust federations arranged as a federation of federations
(as has been proposed by the EU project GUIDE).
Such an approach would also heavily depend on the
willingness of the EU member states to participate in
a shared provision of identity management. Research
that was conducted by Seltsikas and Papas [13] revealed
that the types of trans-national government information
system that would be needed to provide pan-European
identity services can involve hundreds or even thousands
of stakeholders and that there are significant challenges
in determining a workable set of requirements for such
an information system.
Maturity of online identity management
The second question we can put up for discussion
is whether these types of identity management form
part of a larger, more all-encompassing maturity model.
It is almost inevitable for many countries to start off
with a decentralized approach. This duplication of work
then leads on to one or more federated versions of
online identity management. Finally such a federal form
may eventually lead to the fully centralized model. It
is tempting to view these stages as phases in the life-
cycle of online identity management. Recent research
conducted by Seltsikas in the U.S. suggests that as the
drivers for implementing identity management systems
change over-time there are impacts on the implementa-
tion approach which could move a government between
types [14].
Maturity models have a long standing history in IS
(see e.g., the Capability Maturity Model and Nolan’s
phases of IS integration). From research on those ma-
turity models we know that the concept of maturity
should be approached with extreme caution. First, “more
mature” may not necessarily mean “better”. Second,
“mature” phases may have been formulated to suit a
vested interest, such as providing a commercial incen-
tive to buy more consultancy services. Finally, maturity
phases carry with them the notion of inevitability, in the
same way that humans inevitably age and mature.
We could tentatively suggest that the decentralized
approach is normally a precursor to either the federal
approach or the centralized approach. In that sense,
the decentralized approach can be seen as the “least”
mature of the three. It seems sensible to suggest that
the centralized approach is one that a government could
arrive at without passing through the federal approach,
and that the federal approach is one that a government
could arrive at if a centralized approach is not deemed to
be possible or desirable. Such suggestions are speculative
at this point, and further research would be required to
propose anything in this area with more confidence.
Further theorizing on identity management
The nature of this work is exploratory in the sense that
we have conceptualized types of identity management,
but we have not yet theorized about these types. In
attempting to outline a taxonomy for identity manage-
ment, we realize that some of our conceptual choices
are open to debate. For example, it is legitimate to
question whether there are just three types of identity
management, or whether these are just points on a wider
continuum of approaches. Indeed it can be argued that
there is not one dimension on which these approaches
can be mapped but several.
It is probably difficult at this stage to posit a theory
on the success of online identity management. At this
moment our conceptual apparatus is too crude to provide
such a theory. However, a next step might very well
be the development of an initial theory. Such a theory
would use the types of our framework as antecedents
(why the government adopts the type that it does) or
consequences (why the type has the ramifications that it
has). It might also expand on the effectiveness of each of
the approaches. We could tentatively suggest that most
governments will eventually settle on a federal approach
because the decentralized approach is too inefficient and
vulnerable to fraud and the centralized approach creates
too many privacy concerns and is vulnerable to fall-out
in the case of a single-point of failure.
We offer these intriguing suggestions to the reader
in the hope they will be fruitful avenues for further
discussion and research, and will eventually extend our
understanding of the government approaches to online
identity management.
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